Beatrice J. Boyle v. Glen A. Baggs and Freddie Baggs : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
Beatrice J. Boyle v. Glen A. Baggs and Freddie Baggs
: Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richards, Alsup & Richards; Attorneys for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Boyle v. Baggs, No. 9141 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3496
u 
.... .-9 
. ''J 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BEATRICE]. BOYLE, now I 
Beatrice J. Boyle Wynes, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GLEN A. BAGGS and I 
FREDDIE BAGGS, his wife, 
Respondents and Claimants. 
Case No. 
9141 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
RICHARDS, ALSUP & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
DEE LITHO - OGDEN 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -----------------------------------················· 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ················--··--····--------------------·-·· 2 
ARGUMENT-
Point I. Granting of the Motion to Dismiss Was 
Not Error -----------------·············--·························· 2 
Point II. A Decree Awarding Future Installment 
of Alimony or Support Money Does Not 
Create a Lien Against Husband's Real 
Property as Monthly Installments Accrue .... 3 
Point III. The Fact That Respondents Before 
Purchasing Boyle's Property Were Ad-
vised of the Divorce Decree Is Im-
material ---·········-----·---··-------····-··-··--····-·····--···-11 
CONCLUSION ------------····------------·--·----·-··-·--·-····------··········-·····14 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES: 
Beesley vs. Badger et al 66 Utah 194, 240 Pacific 458 .... 5 
Leifert vs. Wolfer 2 5 NW 2nd, 690 -······-···------···-··--········· 7 
Opensha,rw vs. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 144 Pac. 
2nd, 52 8 ------------·-·-··--·······-·----····-····-----····················-·---1 0 
Robinson vs. Robinson, 18 SO. 2nd,. 29 ····--·-······---------------- 8 
Swanson vs. Graham et al, 179 Pac. 2nd 288 ---·-----·---------- 8 
TEXTS: 
49 Corpus Juis Secundum, Judgments, paragraph 455 ...... 12 
Title Standard 26, Utah State Bar Association, 
78-22-1 UCA, 1953 ------··---····························-······-··-·-- 4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BEATRICE J. BOYLE, now 
Beatrice J. Boyle Wynes, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. I GLEN A. BAGGS and 
FREDDIE BAGGS, his wife, 
Respondents and Claimants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9141 
The record contains a Memorandum of Authorities sub-
mitted by respondents to the trial court. However, this pres-
ent brief contains the authorities cited in the memorandum 
and the arguments made therein. Reference to the memo-
randum in the record is, therefore, unnecessary. 
There is no factual dispute. Respondents emphasize, 
however, the fact that up until the time they purchased 
Boyle's property there had been only one judgment or decree 
docketed in the Boyle divorce - the original decree grant-
ing the wife a divorce and awarding monthly installments of 
support money. When respondents purchased Boyle's prop-
erty they had an attorney examine the abstract and that at-
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torney told respondents the divorce decree was a cloud on 
the title. The matter was then ieferred to a second attorney 
who, relying on Utah Title Sta?dard No. 26, advised respond-
ents the divorce decree was not a cloud on the title. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Respondents will answer each of the points raised by the 
appellant, viz: 
1. Granting the motion to dismiss was not error. 
2. A decree awarding future installments of alimony or 
support money does not create a lien against the husband's 
real property as monthly installments accrue. 
3. The fact that res~ondents, before purchasing Boyle's 
property, were advised of .,the divorce decree is immaterial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GRANTING OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS 
WAS NOT ERROR. 
Re~pondents' Motion to Dismiss -was based upon a failure 
of the petition· to state a claim upon w~ich relief could be 
granted. An 1affidavit accompani~d the motion; and at the 
hearing on the motion the c_ourt iny.ited the appellant to pre-
sent additional evidenc~.- Presumably, then, the <;ourt treated 
the motion as one. for -S1Jmmary judgment. In any event, we 
look to the petition filed by appell~nt to determine if, ad-
mitting the truth of all the allegations thereof, it states any 
cause of action. 
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The petition says two things: ( 1) At the time respondents 
purchased the property there were unpaid installments due · 
under the Boyle divorce decree and ... these unpaid installments 
were a lien on Boyle's property; and (2) respondents were 
advised that the decree for future installments was a lien on 
... 
the property. Being thus put on notice, they cannot now 
deny the lien. 
If either one of these propositions is a correct statement 
of the law, the petition stated a cause of action and the dis-
missal was error. If neither is a proper statement of law, the 
petition doesn't state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
Respondents do not quarrel with the cases cited by appellant 
on this point. The cases undoubtedly are correct. Respond-
ents' objection is not to the form of the petition but to its 
substance. In substance, it resolves itself into an examination 
of the legal correctness of the two propositions above stated. 
Respondents contend both propositi~ns are incorrect and that 
the petition, therefore, stated no facts permitting legal redress. 
If that is true, it serves no useful purpose. to review the- cases. 
Under the most liberal pleading. view-there must be some state-
ment of a legal claim. To determine the correctness of the 
court's ruling, then, we must examine Points· 2 and 3. 
POINT II. 
A DECREE AWARJ?ING FUTURE INSTALLMENT 
OF ALIMONY OR SUPPORT MONEY DOES NOT · 
CREATE A LIEN AGAINST HUSBAND'S REAL 
PROPERTY AS MONTHLY INSTALLMENTS AC-
CRUE. 
3-
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In considering this point we deem it proper to refer first 
to Title Standard No. 26 of the Utah State Bar Association, 
which provides: 
"Does a judgment for future monthly installments 
of alimony constitute a lien on real property of the 
defendant? 
"No. 
"While this is true as to the usual judgment for fu-
ture installments, the rule may be otherwise if the judg-
ment is for past due installments, for a lump sum amount, 
or if it specifically provides that the judgment shall 
constitute a lien." 
Attorneys generally have followed this standard for many 
years. Some attorneys have questioned it. Mr. Paul B. Can-
non of the Salt Lake County Bar wrote an article in support 
of this standard in the July-September, 1949, Utah Bar Bulle-
tin. We refer the court to this article. Admittedly, attorneys 
don't make the law. The court is not bound by the title stand-
ard. Admittedly, also, there is substantial authority contrary 
<' 
to the rule thus announced. See the annotation cited by ap-
pellant in 50 A.L.R. 2, 651. There will be great confusion in 
Utah property titles and substantial distress among the Bar 
if appellant prevails and the title standard is now, after all 
these years, rejected. Nonetheless, we admit that the court 
can't concern itself exclusively with the immediate conse-
quences of its rulings but is bound by the dictates of logic, 
reasonableness and, when applicabl~, stare decisis. 
The title standard rule is reasonable and it is logically 
correct. Under our law, a judgment is a lien from the time 
it is docketed (78-22-1, U.C.A., 1953). By negative inferences, 
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if nothing is docketed there can be no lien. Now, what judg-
ments create liens? Among other requirements, the judgment 
must be for a definite and certain sum of money. See 49 C.J.S., 
Judgments, paragraph 458. In Bee~ley vs. Badger et al, 66 
Utah 194, 240 Pacific 458, the court said: 
". . . . That a money judgment may be a lien, it 
is essential, not only that there be a valid and subsisting 
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction 
and subject to collection by execution, but the judgment 
must also be for the payment of a definite and certain 
sum of meny." 
Our next inquiry, then, is whether or not a decree of 
divorce which provides for indefinite installments of support 
money creates a lien when docketed. Clearly not, because 
there is no money judgment for a sum certain. ·There is no 
money judgment because as of the date of the decree nothing 
is due from the father. There is no certain sum because the 
installments are for an indefinite period of time. That is the 
specific holding of Beesley vs. Bad!?er. The court asks itself 
if the divorce decree as alleged (involving installment pay-
ments of alimony) constituted a lien on the husband's real 
estate, and it answers the question thus: 
"A judgment or decree awarding alimony in a gross 
sum, though payable in future installments, is neverthe-
less definite and certain as to the sum of money to be 
paid. So is a decree as to past-due and unpaid install-
ments. In such instances the amount due and to be paid 
to discharge the lien is certain and definite, and, if sought 
to be enforced by execution, the amount due and unpaid 
can be stated in the writ of execution. But not so as to 
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future installments of a decree awarding alimony of a 
stated sum to be paid monthly covering an indefinite 
period." 
We know, then, that this Boyle decree when docketed 
created no lien. The next inquiry is whether or not a lien was 
created automatically as installments became due and were 
unpaid. This question takes us back to our original inquiry 
as to what creates a lien. Liens do not arise automatically. 
They arise by virtue of docketing. Nothing is docketed with 
respect to unpaid installments and, therefore, no lien arises. 
That, it would seem to us, is the logic of the problem. You 
can't ignore the statute as to what creates a lien. You can't 
create something out of nothing. If a wife wants a lien, she 
must reduce the deficiency to judgment so that there is some-
thing to be docketed. 
On page 1 7- of her brief appellants says this: 
"A divorce decree awarding support money differs 
from a luinp sum money judgment only in that it is pay-
able in monthly installments. In both judgments an award 
of ~oney is made to the plaintiff, which if not paid, is a 
lien against any real property of the defendant. To as-
certain what amou-nt is due requires a look at the calen-
dar to see what installments have accrued under the 
divorce decree and to see what interest has accrued This 
is also true under an ordinary money judgment." 
If our reasoning above is correct, and if Beesley vs. Bad-
ger is correct, this -statement of appellant's is patently wrong. 
A divorce decree providing for installment payments of ali-
mon~ differs from a lump sum money judgment in that in one 
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case there is a sum certain to be paid, and in the other there 
is not. This is the distinguishing feature. Appellant, then, 
says in effect that it is easy in both cases to determine how 
much is due. The difference, however, is that in the lump sum 
judgment you have an immediate lien created by docketing, 
and your inquiry is into the extent of the lien. In the install-
ment alimony situation, you never have the one act that 
creates the lien to begin with - the docketing of a judgment 
for a definite sum. 
It serves little purpose to review decisions from other 
jurisdictions because the cases vary according to the particular 
statutes involved. However, we might look to a few cases to 
see the rationale of the courts. 
In Leifert vs. Wolfer (North Dakota) 25 NW 2nd 690, 
there was an award of attorney's fees and costs and monthly 
installments of child support. The court startes that the decree 
as to the attorney's fees and costs is a lien on the father's 
property because it is a judgment for a sum certain. It then 
states: 
"We have noted the distinction between a judgment 
for alimony in a- fixed amount and one for an undeter-
mined amount with stated payments until changed. In 
the former case there is a judgment for a specific amount 
and this judgment is a lien upon real estate by statute 
independent of the court's action declaring it a lien. 
\Vhen there is no stated amount, but the decree requires 
monthly payments before any lien attaches there must be 
some judicial determination of the amount due. . . . . 
"The lien defendant claims is based upon the pro-
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visions of the decree of divorce. The only lien the court 
could create is a judgment lien as created by statute, and 
no judgment was sought nor entered for unpaid install-
ments of alimony. Under proper procedure it could have 
entered judgment for unpaid installments and thus have 
granted a judgment lien." 
Again in Robinson vs. Robinson (Florida) 18 SO. 2nd 
29, there was a judgment for future installments of alimony 
and for attorney's fees and costs. In refusing a lien as to 
delinquent alimony installments the Florida court said: 
''. . .. It seems that the latter items (fees and 
costs) would be governed by the law relating to garnish-
ment after judgment, but it occurs to us that the former 
does not fall in the same category. 
"Allotments for permanent alimony do not become 
liens when made because from their very nature they 
are indeterminate and inconclusive. (Quoting case) they 
may be adjusted or revised because of change in circum-
stances of the parties, or they may be discontinued be-
cause of remarriage of the wife or the death of one party. 
Such allowances may, of course, become judgments if 
after default a competent court adjudges them due and 
payable, .... " (Parenthesis added). 
Similar reasoning is found in Swanson vs. Graham et al 
(Washington) 179 Pac. 2nd, 288, wherein the court quotes an 
earlier W:;tshington case as follows: 
"The general rule seems to be that a decree for ali-
mony creates no lien upon the estate of the husband, in 
the absence of statutes so providing, unless the decree 
fastens it upon some particular property. It is a personal 
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"Accrued judgments for unpaid alimony installments 
are a basis for writs of garnishment, writs of attachment 
and general executions, and may be collected through 
contempt proceedings. But do such judgments, as they 
accrue, become a lien on the property of the defendant? 
What is it, under the statute, which creates the lien? It 
is the entry of the judgment, and the extent of the lien 
is limited to the amount of such judgment, plus interest 
and costs. At the time a judgment providing for future 
payments of alimony installments is entered, there is no 
debt due. There is nothing to secure. There is nothing 
for which a lien could come into being. (The situation 
would be different, of course, if the judgment provided 
for alimony in a lump sum.) As the installments accrue 
and are unpaid, they become judgments. But such judg-
ments do not become statutory liens. In order to create 
a statutory lien there must be a judgment for a specific 
amount and it must be entered. Immediately upon its 
being entered, in order to secure its collection, the de-
fendants property is encumbered. It is then impressed 
with the lien." 
Admittedly there is authority both ways on this· question. 
It seems to us, however, that the rule of the title standard is 
the one that is logical. Also, it seems to be the most reasonable 
rule. As some of the courts point out, any other rule would 
impose almost impossible restraints upon the alienation of real 
property. Suppose the rule were as appellant would have it. 
A divorced man desires to sell property and the judgment in 
the divorce case shows only an award of alimony in install-
ments. The man paid alimony for years directly to his former 
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wife and until she remarried and moved away. The former 
wife can't be located to give a release. How can he possibly 
sell that property? You can't determine that there are no un-
paid installments, and hence you don't know if there is a lien 
or not. Possibly he could go to court and publish notice to his 
missing former wife and get some sort of decree that nothing 
is payable, but that is a questionable procedure that might be 
subject to collateral attack. In this day of such divorce pre-
valence the rule sought by appellant would tie up property 
so that most titles would be bad. It is reasonable to require 
of a purchaser of real property that he examine the judgment 
roll. To require anything more than that, however, is to im-
pose quite frightening obligat~ons upon the purchaser. The 
object of modern law should be and is to make it easy, not 
difficult, to transfer titles. 
Divorces are unique, and remedies are granted to the 
aggrieved wife and mother that are not available to any other 
creditor. Only for an alimony or support money debt can the 
debtor be imprisoned. Similarly, in the normal judgment laches 
cannot operate to defeat the judgment. However, laches can ,.. 
excuse the payment of installments of support money. The 
Utah court points this out in Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 105 
Utah 574, 144 P. 2nd 528. There are many other matters that 
can properly be considered in determining the amount of an 
alimony or support money delinquency. For example, the 
father may show that he in fact had custody of and supported 
the child during the period of claimed delinquency. It doesn't 
seem to make sense to encumber real property titles with the 
many uncertainties attendant upon alimony quarrels. This 
10 
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is particularly true when there is a very simple, orderly pro-
cedure available to the aggrieved wife - the re~ucing of any 
delinquencies to judgment. 
POINT III. 
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENTS BEFORE PUR-
CHASING BOYLE'S PROPERTY WERE ADVISED 
OF THE DIVORCE DECREE IS IMMATERIAL. 
Respondents are not certain exactly what appellant 
-claims by her Point III. Apparently it is one of two things, 
or both, viz: 
(a) Notice of the existence of the Boyle decree before 
they purchased the property put respondents on a duty of in-
quiry, and had they made proper inquiry they would have dis-
covered there were unpaid installments; and 
(b). Since respondents had notice of the decree they are 
not bona fide purchasers for value and . hence cannot cut off 
appellant's lien. 
Appellant cites no authority to support her contention 
and neither do we. However, the question involves the duty 
of a bu~er of property. How f~r must he go in making an in-
quiry? The answer would seem to be that he must go far 
enough into the record to determine if. there is a judgment lien 
against the property being purchased. He satisfies this re-
quirement when he examines the judgment roll to determine if 
there is a judgment or decree and, if so, the nature thereof. It 
is not necessary and should not be necessary that he go 
1: beyond the judgment roll because if there is a lien it arises 
~ 
11 
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by virtue of the docketing in the judgment roll. Again, if 
he is required to go beynd that the purchaser just can't safely 
buy property in many instances. In this case, the petition 
states respondents were advised that there was a judgment 
lien for alimony and support money against the seller which 
was a cloud on the title. The question whether or not a 
particular attorney determined the judgment to be a lien 
or a cloud is not important. The important inquiry is whether 
or not, in fact, the judgment was a lien or a cloud. If it is 
not, respondents were entitled to purchase the property free 
of any lien even if every attorney in the state advised other-
wise. 
At page 20 of her brief appellant states that respondents 
are not bona fide purchasers for value because they dis-
regarded their counsel's advice regarding the title. Again, it 
seems to us the inquiry is whether or not there was, in fact, 
a lien. The injection of this thought of bona fide purchasers 
into the case requires that we examine into the nature of 
judgment liens. If these liens are equitable liens, an inquiry 
into the bona fides of the parties is proper. The lien, how-
1ever, is not an equitable interest in the property. It is a 
legal right. It is something that is enforced in law and not 
in equity. The nature of a judgment lien is discussed in 49 
C.J.S. Judgments, paragraph 455, wherein we find the follow-
ing language: 
" . . . the lien of a judgment does not constitute 
or create an estate, interest, or right of property in 
the lands which may be bound for its satisfaction; it 
gives merely the right to levy on such lands to the 
12 
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exclusion of adverse interests subsequent to the judg-
ment; .... 
"The lien of a judgment is merely an incident 
of the judgment, and may not exist independently of 
the judgment; nor does the loss of the lien necessar-
ily impair the validity of the judgment as a personal 
security. The lien of a judgment creditor on real 
propertyy is a legal lien and is a right as distinguished 
from a remedy." 
Since the lien is a legal right it is not subject to being 
cut off by a bona fide purchaser. If the lien exists, it is 
enforceable against the purchaser irrespective of his notice. 
Our inquiry, then, is strictly an inquiry into whether or not 
the lien exists. The controlling issue in this appeal, it seems 
to us, is Point Number 2. 
This question of notice as raised by appellant does 
suggest one other possibility. As alimony delinquencies 
accrue the wife acquires a vested right to reduce the same 
to judgment. Thus she acquires a vested right to acquire 
a lien against the delinquent husband's property. Is it pos-
'sible this vested right to acquire a lien creates in her an 
equitable interest in the husband's property? 
To answer this question we must again consider the 
nature of the lien, and-we refer again to paragraph 455, 49 
C.J.S., Judgments, quoted above. Note that the lien itself 
creates no "estate, interest or right of property in the lands 
!which may be bound for its satisfaction . . . " If the lien 
itself creates no interest in the land, how can the. right to ac-
13 
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quire a lien create an interest? The question answers itself; 
and it seems to us it also answers appellant's arguments con-
cerning -notice. 
There is perhaps one situation in which an inquiry into 
notice to the prospective purchaser might be proper. If 
through misspelling of names or other error the judgment lien 
is defective, the judgment creditor might properly be per-
mitted to show the buyer had notice of the defect or notice 
of _a .judgment against the seller. Of course, we don't have 
that situation in our case. 
CONCLUSION 
Res~ndents _ respectfully urge the court to follow the 
rule of the title standard in this case. We feel, however, we 
~are in a position to so urge not just because it is the title 
standard rule and not just because it has been approved by 
th~ bar generally, but because it is the logical rule. It is the 
r~asonable one. It is the rule that fosters free alienation of 
property. It is the rule which conforms to the greater public 
gbbd.- ' 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, ALSUP & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
14 
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